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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KEENE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.
Case No. 15787
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL
COMPANY, a corporation,
RALPH W. TAYLOR and
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR,
Defendants and
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from Judgment of the Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah
The Honorable John H. Wahlquist

R. BRENT STEPHENS
RICHARD K. CRANDALL, of
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DAVID A. GREENWOOD of
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KEENE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs.
Case No.

15787

R. W. TAYLOR STEEL
COMPANY, a corporation,
RALPH w. TAYLOR and
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR,
Defendants and
Appellants.

Pursuant to Rule 76(e), appellants hereby petition the
court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter.
The ground and reason for this petition is that the
court's opinion, dated April 13, 1979, is based upon an
interpretation of Federal Antitrust Laws, a duty which is
within the exclusi~urisdiction of Federal Courts.
',.,.---;;
DATED this,/'
day of May, 1979.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

~~.-·,

B;-~~~/
Richard K. Crandall
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KEENE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 15787
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL
COMPANY, a corporation,
RALPH w. TAYLOR and
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR,
Defendants and
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING
This is an action by Keene Corporation (hereinafter
"Keene") against R.

w.

Taylor Steel Company, Ralph

w.

Taylor

and Lou Jean M. Taylor (hereinafter "Taylors") for the
purchase price of goods sold on trade account to Grating,
Inc. (hereinafter "Grating").

The Taylors' liability hinges

on their guaranty of Grating's trade account.

The Taylors

claim a defense available to Grating which arises from
Keene's anti-trust violations.
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I

NEITHER THIS COURT NOR THE LOWER COURT
HAS THE JURISDICTION TO I~TEPPPET OP APPLY
FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS AND THIS COURT'S
OPINION AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS' DECISION NOT TO STAY THIS ACTION UNTIL THE
COMPLETION OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST ACTION
DENIES THE DEFENDANTS THEIR RIGHT TO ASSERT
A VALID DEFENSE BASED UPON VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS.
The only bas is for Keene's recovery against the Taylors
is the Taylors' guaranty of Grating's trade account with
Keene.

It is axiomatic that one who guarantees a debt has

all the defenses available to the party who incurs the debt:
[SJ ince the liability of a surety is commensurate with that of the principal, where the principal is not liable on the obligation neither is
the guarantor.
U.S. Leasing Corporation vs.
DuPont, 70 Cal.Rptr. 393, 444 P.2d 65, 75 (Cal.
1968).
See also Continental National Bank vs.
Dolan, 564 P.2d 995 (Colo. App. 1977).
Without doubt if Grating has a defense to Keene's claim,
then the Taylors, having guaranteed Grating's payment, have
the same defense.
Putting all other defenses aside,

it was argued before

this court that Grating does indeed have an anti-trust
defense to Keene's claim.

The foundation for this asserti~

is the pending action of Grating, Inc. v. Keene Corporati~
and Harsco wherein Grating contends that Keene and Harsco
engaged in illegal price-fixing and illegal refusals to
deal.

As noted by the court in its Opinion in this matter,
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the United States Supreme Court decided in Continental Wall
paper Co. v. Louis Voight and Sons Co., 212 U.S. 277, 29
s.ct. 280, 53 L.Ed. 416 (1909), that an anti-trust violation
can be an affirmative defense to a contract action.

(p.2).

Leaving out for the moment any consideration whether
Continental Wall Paper is good law today, it must be made
clear the consequences of the existence or non-existence of
Grating's anti-trust defense to the purchase contracts which
the Taylors guaranteed.

If Grating's anti-trust defense is

valid, the Taylors may well have no obligation to pay the
balance of the trade account.

In this event, judgment

should be reversed and directed in favor of the Taylors.
If Grating's anti-trust defense is invalid, the Taylors
ought to honor their guaranty.
Keene.

Judgment then belongs to

Thus the crux of the matter is whether an anti-trust

defense is available to Grating.
This question whether anti-trust defense exists is
presently being litigated in Grating, Inc. v. Keene Corporation and Harsco, Civil No. NC-75-21, now pending in the U.S.
District Court of Utah for the Northern Division, and
set for trial in September of this year, the defense is
before the court by virtue of Keene's counterclaim for the
balance of the trade account incurred by Grating.

Under

Section 15 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 u.s.c.A. §15,
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which gives exclusive jurisdiction in these matters to the
federal courts, the consideration of this matter is only
proper in the federal courts.
Whether a defense based upon violations of federal
anti-trust laws is valid is not a proper matter of considera·
tion for this court or the trial court.

Exclusive

juri~i~

tion concerning federal anti-trust laws has been given to
the federal courts under Section 15 of the Clayton Act.
This point was adequately made by Keene in its Appellate
Brief.

Keene there cited, among other cases, General Talkinq

Pictures v. De Maree, 275 N.W. 750 (Minn. 1938), where the
court stated:
Whether by way of attack or defense, once raised,
the issue is the same.
Its determination in
either case would require this court to apply
federal law, the construction of which is expressly and exclusively placed with the federal courts.
279 N.W. at 753.
(Noted in Respondent's Appellate
Brief at 15).
It is beyond question that the existence or non-existenci
of Grating's anti-trust defense should not be determined~
this court or the trial court, but by a federal court.
It is respectfully submitted that this court went beyond
its authority in its Opinion affirming the trial court judgment for Keene.

Although this court noted that the anti-

trust defense was permissible under Continental Wall PaP!!:•
this court went on to decided tdhat Continental Wall Paper
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had been implicitly overruled.

This is nothing more than

construing and applying federal anti-trust law and deciding,
as a matter of federal law, that Grating does not have an
anti-trust defense.

Both appellant and respondents agreed

that under the law, this court had no authority to make such
a decision.

It makes no difference that the court's analysis

might be correct.

What matters is that the anti-defense

exclusively belong to a federal court for determination.
Therefore, this court erred in construing and applying
federal anti-trust law.
In this case, this court is placed in a serious dilemma.
Cn one side it recognizes that if Grating has a valid defense
against Keene, then the Taylors as guarantors have the same
defense and thus should prevail as a matter of law.

On the

other side, this court is without authority to determine the
validity of the anti-trust defense.

To add to this diffi-

culty, the federal court which has power to adjudicate the
validity of the anti-trust defense has not yet resolved the
issue.
Logically, there are two avenues that may be followed;
rationally there is but one.

the first would be to affirm

the trial court's striking of the anti-trust defense.

This

should not be done as a matter of federal law for, as
discussed earlier, the validity of the anti-trust defense is
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reserved exclusively for the federal courts.

strikin~

If the

of the anti-trust defense is to be affirmed, it must rest on
the trial court's incapacity to decide whether there is an
anti-trust defense, coupled with the trial court's impatience
to wait for the federal court to decide the issue.

Such a

determination is tantamount to telling a defendant that
although he may have a valid defense, the court will not
allow it to be presented because the court which should make
the decision has not as yet done so.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to see any reason
in such a Procrustean approach.

Not only is it patently

inequitable, but it presents two serious problems.

First,

it yeilds the same results as if the court decided to
construe the anti-trust defense (against the Taylors) which
is contrary to the Clayton Act.

It hardly seems judicious

to say that since the court cannot decide the issue of
defense, it will not allow it.

The difference between the

approaches is wholly a matter of technical subterfuge to
avoid a substantive claim.

This is made all the more

obvious by the second problem that dismissing the antitrust defense creates.
If the court affirms the striking of the anti-trust
defense with the resultant judgment for Keene, it faces the
very real potential of creating additional litigation and
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inconsistent results.

Should the federal district court

which has the same question before it allow Grating the
antitrust defense against Keene, Grating would then not be
obligated to pay the trade account balance to Keene.

This

result will not really disturb Keene for it will have
already recovered the amount from the Taylors.

But it will

place the Taylors in the position of having paid out a
guaranty on a subsequently determined unenforceable contract.
The Taylors will then be put in the position of

suffe~ing

the loss or return to court.
It is altogether possible that the Taylors could be
stuck for the loss on an unenforceable contract to which
they were not even a party.

Certainly adopting such an

approach is not in the interest of sound judicial discretion,
especially in light of the alternative approach.
The second approach, and altogether the only rational
one, is to stay the proceedings until the federal court with
the jurisdiction to decide the issue of the anti-trust
defense does so.

This would avaoid all the problems the

first approach presents.

This court would not need to

strike what may be a valid defense simply because it lacks
~thority

to decide on the defense.

possibility of inconsistent results.

Further, it avoids any
And lastly, the

Taylors would not face the position of having been compelled
to pay out on an unenforceable contract.
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Keene in its appellate brief, makes two arguments
against this approach.

First, it argues that since Grating

received the goods, it ought to pay the price rather than
use the proceeds to finance its litigation against Keene.
(p. 39).

This argument has two flaws.

Where Keene acquired

the idea that the proceeds were being used to prosecute the
case against itself is unclear.
found in the record.

Certainly it cannot be

But more important, the argument begs

the question for it assumes that Grating is obliged to pay,
the whole question of the anti-trust defense which only a
federal court

~ay

decide.

Certainly, such circuitous

reasoning cannot stand.
Keene's second argument against staying the
is equally erroneous.

proceedi~s

Keene states:

No stay of this action is necessary because
Grating, Inc. and defendants will receive whatever
remedy they are entitled to from the anti-trust
claims against Keene in the pending federal action.
(Emphasis added).
Respondent's Appellate Brief
at 40.
The fallacy of this argument is obvious when it is noted
that R. W. Taylor Steel Company, R. W. Taylor and Lou Jean
M. Taylor are not parties to "anti-trust claims against
Keene in the pending federal action".

For that reason, the

Taylors cannot receive any remedy in the federal action as
Keene so blatantly asserts.

Certainly, Keene could have

named the Taylors as counter-defendants there and thus

-8-
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avoided the present dilemma, but it chose not to do so.
Thus, both of Keene's arguments against staying the proceedings are inapplicable.
In summation, the Taylors as guarantors of Grating's
trade accounts have any defense Grating may have to the
contract.

Grating claims, and there is reasonable grounds

for the claim, that Keene's anti-trust violations excuse
Grating from the contract.

If this is so, Keene may have no

judgment against the Taylors.

But the validity of this

defense cannot be determined by this court for the matt€r
belongs exclusively to the federal courts.

Thus in affirm-

ing the decision of the lower court in this case, refusing
to stay the action, this court has denied the Taylors a
defense to which the federal court may well determined they
are entitled.
DATED this

day of May, 1979.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &

__
By

_-.---:;;

..

MARTINE~U

---..
,

/ .·
~< ~ _:!'...c::::::>'
Richard K. Crandall
Attorneys for DefendantsAppel lants

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act,
-9-administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served appellant's Petition
for Rehearing and Brief in support thereof, on respondent
Keene Corporation, by causing a true and correct copy
thereof to be mailed, postage prepaid, to David A. Greenwood,
Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy, 141 East 1st South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the 18th day of May, 1979.
DATED this ----1:__
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